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The aim of this paper is twofold: it is intended as a critical assessment of Goldberg's (1995)
construction grammar account ofargument structure phenomena. on the one hand. I and as a
brief sketch of my altenutive to it, with minimum introduction to the framework. which I call
pattern matching analysis. that serves as, on the other.
My arguments go as follows. I start by pointing out that while Goldberg' construction grammar
account is interesring as far as the following points are concerned: (i) the existence proof of
constructional meanings (and constructions), (ii) her proposal of the characterization of constructions,
and (iii) the elaboration of her hypothesis about how constructions are organized in grammar (of
English). These are important groundworks, but there is a question that is not answered or even
addressed. It is the question of emergence, or of "where constructional meanings come from".
When we state, like Goldberg does. that form F = )( V Y (P) Z has a constructional meaning M,
which Goldberg claims can be approximated by M = X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY V-INC Z, for
example. nothing interesting is specified unless it is already accounted for why M should have such
specification, or. in other words, why F is unlikely to have "other" meanings like X V Z so mAT Y
RECEIVE Z. on the one hand, in addition to stating that F is more unlikely to have such strange
meanings as X ASKS WHETHER Y RECEIVES Z OR ~OT BY V-INC Z, on the other. I will suggest that
this is a serious gap in all accounts which make a crucial assumption that grammatical construction is
"pairing of form and meaning", because the assumption precludes the question of emergence, or
where such meanings like M above come from, even ifit is possible to question how form/meaning
pairs are "organized" in grammar.
On account of my question of emergence. I claim that argument structure constructions in the
sense of Goldberg are exactly schematization of syntactic contexts into which some special.
very frequently and productively used verbs like give, put, get, make fit best. The intuitive idea is very
simple: F = X V Y Z (e.g., Ann faxed Bill the memo) is categorized as Goldberg's Ditransitive
Construction, for example, only ifF is a "blend" of twO patterns (= form/meaning pairs), D = X V
Z (e.g., Ann faxed the memo) and E = X W Y Z (e.g., AntI sent Bill the memo), assuming that the
syntactic-semantic operation of "pattern blending" (my e>.."tension of Fauconnier's (1997) notion of
"conceptual blending'') is a pairwise unification of partial (mis)matches between D and E, on the
one hand, and "override" of V over W is permitted. From this blending perspective, construction
effect is characterized as syntactic/semantic override of Dover E. This characterization, I want to
claim, can improve and enrich Goldberg's account in terms of grammatical constructions on the
following grounds: (i) it is of no use to represent so-caI1ed constructional meanings of E = X V Y
(P) Z in abstract terms as X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY (MEANS OF) V-INC Z; (ii) such constructional
meanings are ambiguous because of the ambiguous meaning of the host pattern E = X W Y (P) Z
(where only X, Y and (P) Z are lexically present, but W is absent), provided that the ambiguity of
the pattern stems exactly from the ambiguity of W, which is absent and can, at best, be approximated
by a verb depending on the combination ofX, Y, (P), and Z.
This line of claims are admittedly controversial, or at least not so well established that they can go
\vithout justification (at least \vithin the circle of cognitive linguistics). It is likely, I guess, that my
alternative account \vill be accused for its treatment of semantics. Indeed, it accurate to say that my
account more makes implicit (or transparent, in other words) than makes explicit the semantic
contribution of pattern E. But this is itself one of my points. Even if constructional meaning of E
1. For other 2Speca of CODSlrUction grammar. see Fillmore, tl "I. (1988) and Kay (1997).
e Kow Kuroda, WDert Do C01U/rI«fumll1 Mt"nings Co= From?
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exist, which I hold with Goldberg, it is not guaranteed at all that it is possible to represent them. I
claim that it is inappropriate to assume that forms and their meanings are separable. I rather claim
that if sentences have meanings at all, then fonos are themselves meanings, rather than they are
(mere) expressions of them. For this purpose, I will sketch a theoretical framework, pattern matching
analysis, that gives conceprual and technical foundations to my claims.
2 Review of Goldberg's Construction Grammar Account ofArgument Structure
According to Goldberg (1995), three groups of sentences in (1), (2), and (3) illustrate what she calls
Ditransitive Construction, Caused Motion Construction, and Resultative Construction, which in
tum are special cases ofArgument Structure Construction.
(1) a. Joe kicked Bill the ball. (p. 54)
b. Pat faxed Bill the letter. (p. 3)
c. Chris baked Pat a cake. (p. 34)
(2) a. Pat sneezed the napkin off the table. (p. 3)
b. They laughed the poor guy out of the door. (p. 152)
c. Sam helped him into the car. (p. 152)
(3) a. Pat hammered the metal flat. (p. 81)
b. He ate himselfsick. (p. 192)
c. She kissed him unconscious. (p. 3)
Goldberg's claim is that, under the general definition of constructions as "pairings of synta.x and
semantics that can impose particular interpretations on expressions containing verbs which do not
themselves entail the given interpretations" (p. 220). the three cases of the argument structure
construction, illustrated above, are such pairings of form F and meaning M, denoted by C = < F,
.M>, as specified in (4), where all occurrences ofBY V-ING (Z) are my exrrapolation.2
(4) C1= <F =X V Y z; ~ = X CAUSES YTO RECEIVE Z BY V-INC (2»
C2= <F = X V Y z; ~ = X CAUSES YTO MOVE Z BY V-L-.G (Y»
C3= <F =X V Y Z; M; = X CAUSES YTO BECOME Z by V-INC (Y»
where C I' C2' and C3 are Ditransitive, Caused Motion, and Resultative Constructions, respectively.
2.1 How constructions work to derive "emergent" meanings
Let us see how constructions work by takingJoe kicked Bill the ball [= (l)a], for example. which
instantiates Dirransitive Construction. According to Goldberg (p. 54), the meaning of this sentence is
constructed in the way that the follo\ving diagram is a schematization of it.









R: means KICK < kicker ~ kicked>~ ~ ~
Syn: V SUB] OB] OB]2
Figure 8.1 [ef Goldberg's Figure 2.9,1995, p. 54]
To annotate, the first row, Sem(antics), specifies the "constructional" meaning (ambiguously) assigned
to F = X V Y Z. The meaning can be encoded by X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY R, or
2. For relevant definitions of (grammatical) construction, see Lakoff (1987), Lmgacker (1987, 1991". 1991b) in
addition to Fillmore tl ,,/. (1988) and Kay (1995).
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approximated by translating it as "X causes Y to receive Z by (means) ofR", whete X = agent, V =
cause-receive, Y = recipient, and Z = patient. On the other hand, kick has semantics of its own, as
the second row, R: me~, specifies: its semantics is given as X KICK Y, where X = kicker, and Y =
kicked. Integration of all of these specifications leads to the meaning, at Syn(tax), ofX kick Y Z so
constructed that 'Joe causes Bill to receive the ball (by means of kicking it (= the ball))" is a close
approximation of it.
2.2 Conceptual problems with Goldberg's account
Goldberg is right, I presume, in claiming that the semantics (and the argument structure in the sense
of Grimshaw 1990) of sentences in (1), (2), and (3) are not exhaustively determined by semantics of
main verbs, and therefore there must be some other source which is responsible for the meaning
constructed. For example, the meaning ofJoe kicked Bill the ball (= (1)01) is approximated by
translation 'Joe causes Bill to receive the ball by kicking it".
I am willing to agree v..'ith Goldberg (and disagree \Vith lexical semanticists that she criticizes) in
stressing that constructional meanings under discussion cannot reduced to meanings of certain lexical
items, e.g., kidc, fax. But I disagree with her that there is nothing explanatory in stating, or
stipulating that constructional meanings for Ditransicive, Caused Motion, and Resultative Constructions
can be approximated by such schemas as M.. J~. and J~ defined in (4) above. When we state, like
Goldberg does, that form F = X V Y (P) Z has a constructional meaning M, which he claims can
be approximated by M 1 =X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY V-ING Z, for example, nothing interesting
is specified unless it is already accounted for why M should have such specification. This is the
question of emergence, or of where constructional meanings come from, which I claims is
unquestioned in assuming that grammatical construction is "pairing of form and meaning", because
the assumption precludes the question of emergence, or where such meanings like AJ above come
from.
2.2.2 Arbitrariness in semantic representation
The last question sets up for my first conceptual objection to Goldberg's construction grammar
account. I, for one, find it "gratuitous" to assume meaning schemes like MI, lvLz. and M3in (4).3 This
is a (passable) convention that has a relatively long tradition, which we will have a chance to discuss
afterwards, but this is also a good place to hide undesirable things, I suspect. To reveal this (rather
controversial) point, let me ask a simple question, Is there any "independendy motivated" reason to
prefer (5)1 (= M1 in (4» over other candidates in (5), on the one hand, and in (6)-(8)?
(5) 1. X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY V-ING Z (= lv~ in (4»
1'. X GETS Y TO RECEIVE Z BY V-ING Z
1". X MAKES Y RECEIVE Z BY V-ING Z
(6) 1. X V Z AND (X) CAUSES Y to RECEIVE Z
I'. X V Z AND (X) GETS Y TO RECEIVE Z
1". X V Z AND (X) MAKES Y RECEIVE Z
(7) 1. X V Z TO CAUSE Y TO RECEIVE Z
I'. X V ZTO GET YTO RECEIVE Z
I". X V Z TO MAKE Y RECEIVE Z
(8) 1. X V Z so THAT Y RECEIVE Z
I am very aware that it is possible to justify this position probably by appealing to so-called "semantic
primitives", but I claim that such justification is itself spurious: it is possible to postulate that CAUSE is
a semantic primitive that GET, MAKE, and many others related concepts are possibly composed o( But
the postulation is, as far as I can tell, more hannful than useful. Note, first of all, that the argument is
double-edged: it may defend the attacked position, but it also attacks the reason why RECEIVE should
3 This does never mean, I want to renurk here, that diagr2=tically account (using image-schenus) is superior,
because it has as much ~tuitous basis as this.
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be preferred over HAVE (X CAUSES }' TO HAVE Z BY V-ING 2), since it is likely that the concept
RECEIVE is composed ofHAVE. So, there is a contradiction to semantic primitive.
But, of course, it is of no use to replace M 1 by X CAUSES Y TO HAVE Z BY V-ING Z. What to do
when asked, Is HAVE primitive enough? Or! Is CAUSE primitive enough? Or, more seriously, why is
C....USE a primitive? Plainly, ifthey are primitives, they are so merely by definition.
Note that what crucially matters is not any use of such primitives, or simply concepts, but the
way they are used. To reveal this, let me ask, What allows us to put such primitives as C...USE,
RECEIVE into sentence-like forms like X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY V-ING Z, on the one hand, and
predicate-like forrns like CAUSE-RECEIVE<X, Y, Z>, on the other? Or more adequately, why is it
that they have such "synra.x"? .Is it a claim for "syntax of semantics", or "semotactics", if I could say
so, to assume that semantic primitives "must" be arranged in such and such way? I will retum to this
issue latet.
In any case, Goldberg's construction grammar account assumes, I claim gratuitously, that formats
in small capitals like Ml' M 2, and M) "represent" (or at least "characterize") a way F = X V Y Z
means something. But the conventionalized use of small capitals, I claim, is a mere "notational
trick", though it has a long tradition which dates back to Generative Semantics" In my opinion, the
convention is so dangerously misleading that we should stop assuming as soon as possible, since its
careless use inevitably leads to the absurdity that I specify below.
Think of what the semantics of (9)a will be (represented or approximated) in terms of small
capitalization under discussion. According to Goldberg's account, it is (10)b, isn't it? Bur, if (lO)b is
to represent the meaning of(9)a, then what would the semantic representation of (9)b be given as?
(9) a. joe kicked Bill the ball.
b. joe caused Bill to receive the ball, (by kicking it,).
(10) a. JOE KICKED BILL THE BALL
b. JOE CAUSED BILL TO RECEIVE THE BALLi BY KICKING IT,
I believe that it is obviously (10)b. Here begins the absurdity. It follows that (9)a and b have the
same meaning. But note that it also follows (lO)a = (lO)b, because if (10)b represents the meaning of
(9)b, (10)a must represent the meaning of (9)a in the same way. As a consequence, there is no
difference in meaning between (9)a and (9)b. Is this really what we have wanted to show? I believe
nor.
Do semantic forms like (10)a, b, or more generally, X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY V-ING IT really
"represent" one of the meanings that X V Y Z have ambiguously? I think not. The reason is almost
obvious: paraphrases, or more adequately translations, are not representations.s
Once it turns out that what is encoded by M, = X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY V-ING Z is not
anything but the meaning of sentence G = "X causes Y to receive Z by V-ing Z", a question
immediately arises: Why the meaning ofF = X V Y (P) Z, ifcategorized as Dirransitive Construction,
can be translated by such G? This is exactly the question that we have first to account for.
Most contemporary analyses of syntactic phenomena are victims of this trick of small capital
notation, which seems to have begun since Lakoff (1970) through partial success of generative
semantics in late 60's and early 70's. To cheat this trick, a quite sticking one, I want to remark as
follows: the meanings of (9)a and b are not represented by (10)a and b, which are at best awkward
translations of what (9)a and b mean, though almost virtually nothing is known about "how" they
mean what they mean.
By this remark, I am trying to confirm, or reconfirm, a simple fact of trivial sort: forms, surface
4. According to Harris (1993), this nor..tional convention began when Lakoff. motinted by the vexing fur that
English has no verb aggrw. at least as a surUce fonn. while it has aggressi"", proposed, in lrrrgularity in Syntax (his Ph.D_
dissertation. published bter as Lakoff (1970) under the urne tide), an abstract, "underlying" verb denoted by clunce by
....CGREss.
5. J suspect this is also true of the sr..tus of "illUge-schenus" in the sense of Lakoff (1987). and "inugery" in the
sense of Lang:Jcker (1987, 1991a. b). I agree that what is called meaning is usually accompanied by illUgery, if not
images. of various sons. But this do<:s not entail that image schemas, or inugery, "constitute" meaning. even if they nuy
"guide" meaning consruction. by "monitoring" it. It seems very likely to me that image-schemas do not represent
meanings of linguistic expressions. Rather, they have meanings of their own, and the}' happen to "translate" the
meanin~ oflin~c expressions.
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or deep, are themselves e:x-pressions of meanings. My real intent is more than this, however: more
radically put, I suggest that fonus are themselves meanings rather than mere expressions of them.
Examined from this point of view, it is clear that Goldberg's account £ails to provide account of
an important point: Why is it that the meaning of F = X V Y (P) Z, or more adequately the
"interpretation ofF', denoted by d(F) hereafter, is so approximated that the meaning of another
torm G = X causes Y to receive Z by V-ing Z' (where Z' is usually realized as it) is an "awkward
translation" of d(F)? There is circularity in Goldberg's account here. Note that it is circular to
answer the question by saying that .M, = X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY V-ING Z' is the meaning of
G. Note that iV) is the meaning of G only by the notational convention assumed. So, there is
nothing accounted for in small captitalizing it.
It is clear that Goldberg's construction grammar account no longer says anything about the
semantics of syntactic form(ation) F = X V Y Z once it is disallowed to make reference to such
constructs AI) = X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY V-ING Z. But this is not a good reason to assume one.
There is indeed a better way to specify constructional meanings. To anticipate. let me sketch it
briefly here. Take F = Xfax Y (to) Z for example. Such stipulated forms like M r are dispensable only
ifwe are entitled ro say that the d(F) is "based on" G' = X send Y to Z, on the one hand, and on
G" = X give Y to Z, on the other, assuming that G' is itself based on G". To put schematically
(and somewhat misleadingly), the problem of constructional meanings ofF will be solved only if it is
allowed to replace send by fax in the conte:.,,:t F = X send Y to Z, though this "transformational" rule
explains nothing but a simple fact that there exists a class of grammatical phenomena which the
transformational rule may describe with certain adequacy. Of course, our interest is the question of
why there is, or should be, such class ofphenomena in grammar.
3 Brief Introduction to Pattern Matching Analysis
We have seen so far that Goldberg's account explains nothing about the origin of constructional
meanings, mainly because constructions are defined as pairs of forms and meanings, because her
account is not an account of the reason why X V YZ is associated to some meaning A1 approximated
by translating it by "X causes Y to receive Yby V-ing Z'.
It is umeasonable and irresponsible, however, to merely note that construction-based account
like Goldberg's is inadequate on this ground. Indeed, her study reveals a lot of interesting things
about construction effect, especially their network. I merely note here that there are still a lot of
other things to be done, especially about what she takes for granted. We need alternative accounts
for such matters.
Our problem is thus whether we can provide an alternative account better than, or as good as
Goldberg's account without relying on spurious translations like X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY V-ING
Z. I believe this is possible, but let me remark that it is hardly possible unless we give up the idea of
representing meanings of sentences in terms forms other than themselves, let alone such spurious
rranslations.
This requirement, which we may dub no deep(er) representation requirement, may seem
somewhat roo severely restrictive, though, because what it requires is to regard and treat surface
forms as direct (expressions of) meanings by themselves, without appealing to abstract structures,
semantic or no, behind them. What we are entitled to do is make generalizations from surface
distribution of forms, investigate relationships among surface forms, not relationship between forms
and their meanings, actual or potential. This requ'irement is apparently incompatible with definition
of constructions as form-meaning pairs, because, even if we want to generalize over meanings, it is
not allowed to talk about meanings without reference to surface forms. But there is a simple
solution. It is sufficient to think that what we call constructions are not really form-meaning
correspondences, but rather higher order properties of form-form correlations correlating ~ith
meaning-meaning correspondences, which the distribution of surface forms is a manifestation or
symbolization of.
But it turns out that any attempt at elaboration of even such a fairly simple idea demands much,
if not too much, groundwork. Indeed, we need a conceptual tool that is powerful enough to
dispense with constructions as form-meaning pairs altogether. We need thus a tool to facilitate us to
analyze such form-form correspondences as manifestations of meaning-meaning correspondences.
The analysis of this kind of relationships is what a method that I have been developing under the
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name of pattern matching analysis (Kuroda 1996, in preparation), which was inspired largely by
Lakotrs (1993) "cognitive phonology", a construction-based approach to phonological phenomena,
though I have to admit that I do not adopt Lakoff's original idea of (phonological) constructions as
"two-level rules" (in the sense of Karttuenen 1993) which associate representations at different
"levels". This is because I think it is possible to dispense with the idea of "underlying" representation,
even for phonological/morphological phenomena, for the same reason that (grammatical) constructions
in the sense of Goldberg are, as I have argued, not association of surface fonns to underlying
meanings at all. More deeply, I think that it is possible to dispense with the idea that there is a level
of representation that is responsible for "pure" representation ofmeanings, or semantic representation.
Such a view of forms/meaning relation smells is quite problematic. Rather, I want to hold, every
linguistic units are form-meaning associations since the deepest level, if any. So, it is conceptualIy
vacuous to assume that there is a single level that pure meanings exist without being put in certain
fonns. No such "transcendental", "impenetrable" level of representation is necessary. Indeed, such
an idea is already contradiction 'with cognitive credo that meaning is based on bodily experiences
(Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987). Bodily experiences, linguistic or not, are themselves certain SOrt of
fonns, I hold. So, pure representation of linguistic meaning \\;thout being put into linguistic
form is unthinkable; i£ is as unthinkable and as absurd as the library in Babel. There are a lot of
meanings that linguistic fonns cannot, or hardly can, express. But, my point is that if some meaning
is not in linguistic form, it is no longer linguistic meaning, either. See Kuroda (in preparation) for
more detailed discussion.
In any way, pattern matching analysis is designed to serve as a good method to do with
correlations among surface fonns as reflections ofhidden meaning-meaning correlations. The following
discussion in this section is devoted to a short introduction to the method that I propose.
3.1 Relevant details of pattern matching
As we will see below, pattern matching analysis is so-called because it crucially relies on the notions
"patterns" and their "matching". As noted above, it provides a useful method to explore into
correspondences among surface forms (with implicit semantics) under some crucial assumptions that
I specify in the follo\ving.
In this analysis, surfaces forms are everything we are entitled to talk about. This is because,
somewhat controversially, linguistic forms and their meanings are not distinguished. It tries to
cleanse linguistic analysis of as many gratuitously "abstract" representations, semantic or syntactic,
formal or conceptual, as possible. Such abstract representations may not be exploited for "explanatory"
purposes, though they are likely to be utilized for "descriptive" purposes. From this comes a
principle: no "underlying" forms are posited for syntactic or semantic or any other kinds of represen-
tation. In pattern matching view, if there are something like underlying fonns, they are merely
special kind of surface forms, or more exactly "potential components" of them. Roughly, the notion
oflinguistic "levels" is replaced by that of "scales", or "size".
Given a rather loose idea of syntactic patterns as being something like complex associations of a
variety of properties, formal and conceptual, we need furthermore the notions of "(partial) marches
and mismatches" between patterns to state form-form correspondences in tenns ofpattern matching.
Given two patterns F and G such that F = A BCD and G = A CBD. The correspondence
between F and G is described (rather than accounted for) in terms of pattern matching under
"optimization of partial mismatches". A pair ofpanems match exactly ifand only if all parts of them
match with each other. So, quite trivially, a pattern exactly matches only with itself Virtually all
correspondences involve at least one partial mismatches, since they are relations between "different"
patterns. Such mismatches need be "optimized". We assume two (and presumably only two) principles
ofoptimization, specified as follows.
(11) Principles of Pattern Matching Optimization:
A. Ma.ximize the number ofpartial matches
B. Minimize the number ofpartial mismatches
Under these assumptions, the correspondence between F = ABCD and G = ACBD has two
ways of optimization of partial mismatches, as illustrated as follows. (12) illustrates one way of
optimizing partial mismatches, relative to subpattern B, whereas (13) illustrates another, relative to
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subpattern C.
(12) F: A B C D
x x
G: A C B D
(13) F: A B C D
x x
G: A C B D
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where only parWl mismatches are indicated by inserting "x" ben"een them, assuming that partial
matches are defuult.
A special kind of subpatterns, called "phantoms", symbolized by ... ", plays a crucial role in
optimiution of mismatch resolution. We assume that phantoms match any subpattern. For more
details of pattern matching, especially as to optimization procedure, phantoms, see Kuroda (1996, in
preparation).
What pattern matching analysis assigns to sentences are not "constituent structures", or "phrase
markers". For one thing, trees, in mathematical sense, are not powerful enough to characterize
properties of syntactic structures properly. Syntactic structure, if anything, is a "web" of units, in
which units communicate with each other. Hierarchical structure is apparent, and more appropriately
an "emergent" property out of the complex interactions among units. For another, we do not need,
at least for practical purposes, any constructs but sequences of units of arbitrary sizes, as fur as they
can be composed by "superposition". In this crucial respect, patter matching analysis can share
insights with (somewhat misleadingly called) "autosegmental", or more appropriately "multiplanar"
theory of representation.6 In agreement with the autosegmental view, I contend that a well-designed
system of syntactic and semantic operations on strings can handle as successfully as systems of
operations on phrase-marker trees, and whatever looks like them. Syntactic patterns, which we
understand are fonn-meaning pairs, are sequences of certain units on different "planes". Superposition,
based on principles of matching, of such patterns over each other results in complex structures. On
this view, we can dispense with trees altogether. I will rerum to this issue in the last section.
3.2 Illustrating pattern matching
For illustration, let us consider the correspondence between (14)a and b.
(14) a. They loaded bricks in(to) the truck.
b. They loaded the truck with bricks.
Incidentally, (14)a meets Goldberg's definition of caused motion construction. The status of (14)b in
Goldberg's account is unclear, however. As far as semantics is concerned, it is analogous to ditransitive
construction, but its synta.x is different. The following variation is deviant.
(14) b'. *They loaded the truck bricks.
Interestingly, verbs like provide, supply began to allow both patterns, as illustrated below, at least in
recent usage.
(15) a. I can't provided you ?(with) everything.
b. He supplied the people ?(with) food and drink.
This fact suggests that there is a super class of ditransitive construction, which I suspect is of the fonn
F = X V Y (P) Z. where P may be null. If P = with, it sanctions (14)b. Additionally, if P = of, it
sanctions the following patterns.
(16) a. The accident deprived him ofall of his fortUne.
6. For ~utosemenal phonology, see Goldsmith (1979) and subsequent works. For ~u[osegmenalmorphology. which
is more relevmt. see McCarthy (1981) and subsequent works.
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b. You must divest yourself ofpride. (LDCE. divest)7
c. God deaf/se me ofmy wickedness. (LDCE. deaf/se)
d. The robbers stripped him of all he possessed. (LDCE, strip)
Surely, this pattern is deviant; but note that the act of depriving is the reverse of that of giving. In
other words, they have something in common in some abstract level, and I suspect that such
commonality is symbolized by this class ofconstructions.
Let us return to the original problem. Our concern is with the form-form correspondence (with
implicit meaning-meaning correspondence) of (14)a and b. How can it be characterized? My
proposal is given in (17) and (18), where partial mismatches are optimized, in two ways, to meet the
two principles stated in (11).
(17) F: they loaded bricks in the truck
x x x x
G: they loaded the truck with bricks
(18) F: they loaded bricks in the truck
x x x x
G: they loaded the truck with bricks
Here, I want to reserve myself from claiming which is the correct one, alluding that it is possible that
both are correct. What I can suggest here is simply that. ifF is deemed basis, G manifests, in both
(17) and (18), relative "advancement" of the trod~, a "container" to be filled.
What the optimized pattern matching in (17) embodies are: there are partial mismatches between
F and G \vith respect to bricks, i,!, with, and there are partial exact matches with respect to all other
pairs.
A few remarks are in order. Correspondences like the last one claim no "derivation" from one
form to the other, since in (17) and other cases, none of F and G is the "underlying" form of the
other. Furthermore, correspondences like this by no means claim that F and G are synonymous
sentences. The contrary is true: since F and G are different forms, they can never be identical in
meaning, either. This is exacdy because forms, we assume, are themselves meanings, rather than
imprecise "expressions" of them.
Under those assumptions made so far, the remainder of this section is devoted to a prelimilUlj'
discussion of my alternative anaJysjs of the construction effect.
3.3 (onstnKtions from the perspective of pattern matching: Apreliminary analysis
As noted above, one of our questions is this: How to limit on the proliferation of formats like those
in (4), and (5)-(7), which are proposed one after another to represent meanings of sentences? This is
a serious problem that deserves intensive c.'CPloration, I believe.
To achieve this, I claim that what we really need is to investigate form-form correspondences (ff
correspondence for short) aiming at probing the hidden meaning-meaning correspondences (mm
correspondence for short) rather than the notion of construction as form-meaning correspondence.
We will see that the form-form correspondence could be successfully handled in terms of pattern
matching, described in some detail below.
With this question in mind, let us compare (19), (20), and (21). In (19) alone, pattern matching is
subject to Goldberg's format, where M replaces Goldberg's Sem, and F, her Syn, where CAUSE and
TO RECEIVE are replaced by MADE and HAVE, respectively.








7. Here and elsewhere, LOCE abbreviares Lcndrtl~n DiaioMry '1fContmrpcray EnJllish (1978).
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(20) M: X V Z AND (X) /'.L\DE Y HAVE Z
X x x x x
F: Joe kicked Bill the ball
(21) M: X V Z rOMAKE Y HAVE Z
X x x
F: Joe kicked Bill the ball
It is important to note first that in the three M-F pairs, h-fs are virtually equivalent to (5), (6),
and (7).
Note neAL that forms at Iv! (= Sem), in terms of pattern matching, can (and in my opinion
should) be regarded as surface fonus (or rather fo:mations) rather than abstract formats of semantic
representation, which Goldberg and many other "conceptualist" linguists have in their minds. I
provided above a few arguments against such a view of linguistic form and meaning, based on the
fact that translations are not representations. A view of language is a "simplistic" view if it takes it for
granted that forms are their meanings are separable. Careless adoption of such a view was a greatest
error ofgenerative semantics, I suspect. Language is so complex a system that such an intuition leads
us to une);pected errors.
So, more appropriately, what we investigate here is rather the comparison among such "form-form
cortespondences" as illustrated in (22). (23), and (24), each of which is a description of partial
matches and mismatches between two surface patterns G (e.g.,Joe made Bill have the ball by kicking it)
and F (e.g.,Joe kicked Bill the halO, where only partial mismatches are marked by inserting "x",
(22) G: X made Y have Z by V-ing Z'
x x x x x x
F: X V Y Z
(23) G: X V Z and (X') made Y have Z
x x x x x
F: X V ( .) Y Z
(24) G: X V Z to make Y have Z
x x x
F: X V Y Z
This difference between the two descriptions embodied by (19), (20). and (21), on the one hand,
and by (22), (23), and (24), on the other, is not notational but conceptual. To see this, let me point
out that Goldberg's conception and our alternative are crucially different in the folloVving respect.
(25) 1. (19), (20), and (21) claim that interpretation ofsurface fonus is a "mapping" from the
domain offonus, Fs, onto that ofmeanings, l\fS, on the one hand, whereas:
11. (22), (23), and (24) claim that the interpretation ofsurface forms is not such a mapping at
all; rather, it is a mental process that could not be equated with "translation", assuming
that the possibility of translation should be accounted for in tenus of "spreading activa-
tion" theory.
It will be relevant here to note that schemes of the first sort presuppose a theory of "cognitive
mapping" in the sense of Fauconnier (1995, 1997), on the one hand, and Lakoff (1990), on the
other. To see this, observe that Goldberg's construction grammar account in fact embodies a
mapping theory in which elements at Sem(antics), or in the domain of meanings are mapped to
elements at Syn(tax), or in the domain of forms.
Of course, whether there is or is not such mapping is not a real problem. because mathematical
concept of mapping is so powerful to be able to formulate any complex aspect of anything which
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exhibits regularity. What really matters is an ontological claim accompanied with it: Are there really
"domains" exclusively of forms and of meanings, which, by definition, are independent of each
other? In my view, postulation of such domains is itself a convenient fiction, which is too powerful
to lead to some empirically inadequate consequences.
3.4 Wbat the distribution of phantoms suggests
Let us introduce the notion of "fusion of pha.,toms", which \ve may believe reflects, or even
symbolizes (in the sense of Langacker 1991a, b), the "fusion of acts/actions" occurring in semantic
dimension. Several phantoms "fuse" themselves into a single phantom on the follo\ving condition.
(26) Phantoms can fuse into one when they cluster. or in other words. constitute a
continuous (and probably coherent) grammatical unit.
Based on this condition, we arrive at the correspondences in (27), (28), and (29), where respective
phantoms in (22), (23), and (24) are fused.
(27) G: X made Y have 2 by V-ing 2
X X x x
F: X V Y 2
(28) G: X V 2 and (X') made Y have 2
x x
F: X V Y 2
(29) G: X V 2 to make Y have Z
x x
F: X V Y 2
Here, phantom fusion increases "matching index M', defined as the ratio of"number ofmarches/num-
ber of units" so that M(22) = 2/9 '" 0.222, M(23) = 4/9 '" 0.444 (or 4/8 '" 0.5), and M(24) = 4/7 '"
0.571 (or 4/8 = 0.5), whereas M(27) =317 '" 0.428, M(28) =3/5 '" 0.6, and M(29) =3/5 '" 0.6.
3.5 MeasuriRq ttte strengtll of similarity by means of Umatching index"
As we have seen just above, pattern matching analysis provides "matching index" M defined as the
ratio of "number of matches/number of units" (depending on scales) as a useful method to measure
the "cost" in matching. Indeed, F-G marching is more "costly" in (27) than in (28) and (29), since
there is no reason not to assume that each partial mismarch costs the same.
This statement can be justified on a quantitative basis, not on a intuitive, qualitative one, for we
have a quantitative method to evaluate the "strength" of correspondence by using Pearson's correlation
coefficient on the assumption that Syntactic patterns can be so encoded that they have unique
vectorial representations in an II-dimensional space. What we have to do is calculate inner products
of two vectors indexing syntactic patterns. This procedure is sure to result in making a "map" of
parrerns.
Under this provision. we can observe that F-G matching in (27) contains 4 parrial mismatches,
namely (made, • ), ( • , V), (luwe.. • ), and (by V-illg 2, • ), whereas (28) and (29) contain 2
mismarches, namely (2 and (X') made, • ) and (have, • ), and (to make, • ) and (have, • ), respectively.
What is implied by this is that, of the three correspondences, (28)G and (29)G are more "similar" to
F = X V Y 2 than (27)G. Furthermore, this property can be cranslated in terms of "motivation".
On this ground, we may hypothesize that this implies that (28)G and (29)G are more strongly
"motivated" than (27)G.8
8. This an be seen as the disaibution ofpluntom clusteIS. In F-fonn. pluntoms cluster two locations. =e!y V _ Y
and Y _ Z, whereas in G-form, they cluster three locations: X_V. Y _ Z, and Z _ . Genenlly speaking, panem
nure:hing is less costly when pluntoms are loalized and clustered.
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3.6 Fusion of causalty chained units
The notion of phantom fusion gives us a hint to figure out why constructions under discussion take
the very form X V Y Z, which is a question that is not even addressed in Goldberg's construction
grammar account. With this point in mind, let us look closely at (6) and (7). repeated here for
convenience, but without small capitalization, since they are no longer intended as semantic contents.
(6) 1. XV Z and (X) made Yhave Z
2. X Vand (X) made Y move Z
3. X Vand (X) made Y become Z
(7) 1. X V Z to make Yhave Z
2 X Vto make Ymove Z
3. X Vto make Ybecome Z
It is interesting to note that, given that the sequences "Z to makelX V Z _ Y ..... and "Z atld (Xl
madtiX V _ Y ..." are reducible, we have at least four reasons, A-E, not to have Goldberg's formats
as ones to specifYing the meaning of relevant constructions.
A. (6) is preferable when we take into serious consideration the possibility of"reference transfer",
by which that X refers metonymically to the preceding clause, X V, rather than the usual antecedent
X By contrast, why X disappears hardly matters. This transfer naturally corresponds to the notion of
clause fusion, perhaps "symbo1izing" event fusion, which takes place when phantoms are reducible,
and plausibly they are reducible only when they are causally "amalgamated" rather than "chained".
Two events, E 1 and E2, are causally "chained" if and only if we interpret that E 1 caused E2' but not
vice versa. Events E1 and E2 are amalgamated if and only if they are mutually causally chained, and
they are conceived of as happening simultaneously (at least in the relevant construal).
B. The remaining problem in A is why Z is reduced in (6)1 (and (7)1). But this could be
accounted for when we take into consideration the possibility that the disappearance of Z is the
effect of what is called "right-node raising" (RNR) of Z in generative tradition.9 So, (6) is preferable
also in this respect. RNR is the kind ofsyntactic phenomena illustrated as follows.
(30) a. Ann is a sister of, and Bill denies that he is a brother of, Cynthia.
b. Andy likes, and Bill dislikes, all songs by Sex Pistols.
But it is also necessary to note that phantom fusion is not subject to the exact form of RNR.
because the exact form of RNR would be (31)G, as matched against (31)F. where C. is "fused"





G: A, B1 and A. ~ C1=2
If RNR-like analysis of ditransitive construction is correct, then we may arrive at the pattern












where phantoms are not fused. Crucial in ditransirive, caused-motion, and resultative constructions
are: (i) A~. coreferential with AI' cannot be overt (or obligatorily null); (ii) Y2 is such anomalous
constituents as makes Y have, makes Y be, and makes Y betome; and finally, (iii) alld is absent.
C. Furthermore. pattern matching based account of emergent senses can avoid the implausibility
9. For more infomution about ri~ht node raisinl'\, see McCawley (1988) and references cited therein.
10. The analysis here is conceptually compatible ",;th McCawley's (1988) analysis ofRNR in terms offusion.
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that Goldberg's account of ditransitive construction, for example, is not free from. Her account does
not provide, in a real sense, the motivation for X V Y Z to have the meaning obviously related to X
give Y Z. since the sense ofgive is decomposed into parts, namely X CAUSE Y, and Y (TO) RECEIVE Z
Pattern matching analysis, however, is even able to provide motivation for it, because it is exclusively
based on relations among sUrUce fonus. Note that there is no difficulty in replacing (28) and (29) by
the following correspondences.
(33) G: X V Z and (X') gave Y Z
x
F: X V Y Z
(34) G: X V Z to give Y Z
x
F: X V Y Z
where there is only one occurrence of partial mismatch between F- and G-forrns. This is a result f.u
from trivial, I believe.
Moreover, (6), and (7) as well, is preferable when we rake into serious consideration the problem
of why "luIvel... Y _ Z' does not appear at sumce. It is interesting to note, in this respect, dut, in
2 and 3, mcve and baome are prevented from freely surfacing. This fearure is only expectable to verbs
tlut rake bare infinitive as W of X V Y W, and is not expectable for formats like "X causes Y W'
because cause requires to-infinitive as W.
D. Admittedly, (6) is preferable also when we rake into serious consideration the position of
tense-bearing elements (-50 -ed), albeit a morphological matter, since we can resegment and recategorize
the result of right-node raising of Z to the end of sentence, as what (35)G and G' specify, by






















where T stands for the element (or fearure) to be realized as -5, or -(e)d, for example.
Note that most of the properties used in A-D to argue for (6) (and (7) are "surface" constraints,
and therefore we cannot expect them to be true of such seemingly "abstract" semantic fonus as
Goldberg's X CAUSES YTO RECEIVE Z BY V-ING Z (especially when they are "(small) capitalized").
The last point forms, I argue, one of the strongest arguments against the notion of constructions
as form-meaning pairs. Constructions have still crucial properties as form-form correspondences. So,
I rather claim that constructional "effects" emerge when meanings of sUrUce fonus are correlated
through the hidden channel of meaning. Based on these, I believe it is not an exaggeration to say
that pattern matching analysis is a method to analyze a network of linguistic form(ation)s rather than
linguistic forms, or formations, per se. This is because it makes use of, in a very sophisticated and
principled way, direct or indirect "based on" relations among form(ation)s.
4 Pattern Blending Account of Constructional Meanings
By discussions so far, I do not intend to revive a version of "transformational" account of the
construction effect. What I have done so f.u are merely a preparation for a better analysis of the
construction effect that follows. So, the analysis with reference to right-node raising is not what I am
trying to replace the Goldberg's (1995) construction grammar account by, partly because right-node
raising is itself a questionable phenomenon, and partly because I have no intention to propose a
transformational account. My real attempt is to replace accounts like Goldberg's on which the
existence of constructions in a grammar is raken for granted by alternative accounts on which the
existence of them is also accounted for rather than stipulated. My alternative is, roughly, based on
the notion ofpattern blending, through which two patterns and are blended into one. This is a
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revlSlon of the "transformational" account that I have noted above. Recall that constructional
meaning of F =Joe faxed Bill the letter, for example, could be described. rather than accounted for,
only ifa set of transformations is posited such that one of them operate on another form G =Joe sell!
Bill the letter to derive F by replacing sent by fax. I admit that this is furly good as a first approximation,
but it is also clear that it accounts for nothing fundarnenul, since the motivation ofsuch transformation,
or the reason why such transformations exist, is not accounted for at all. I \\;ll not deny that my
account in terms of pattern blending is, in a sense, a mere sophistication of such transformational
account, but such effort of sophistication can, or should, be free from any accuse, I claim, as far as it
provides insight. Roughly, my account goes as follows: F =Joe faxed Bill the letter is a "blend" of tWO
patterns, D =Joe faxed the letter and E = Joe sent Bill the letter, in that F "inherits" the synta..x and
semantics of both of them, though partially and selectively: sellt is "overridden" by fax. Bill has no
counterpart in D. Despite these peculiarities, pattern blending, I want to stress, can be understood as
a process of "symbolization", at least in the sense of Langacker (1987, 1991a, b), of a causal unity
between the two events that D and E denote. More explicitly, such a conceptual unity is symbolized
by syntactic and semantic "fusion" of D and E into one F.
This is a rough sketch of what I will provide as a final version is my analysis. I believe this is
already clear enough, at. least conceptually, but it will also be more appropriate to touch on
Fauconnier's (1997) discussion of the rekvant phenomena in terms of "conceptual blending", since
it is fair to state that my idea of pattern blending is panly a reinterpretation of Fauconnier's version
ofblending. So, let me begin by reviewing Fauconnier's proposal.
4.1 FalKOnDief'S alteraatiYe acatallt
Fauconnier's (1997) attempts to provide an alternative account of the construction effect in terms of
"conceptual blending", which he cwms serves as "one important cognitive process that drives some
of this creativity [in producing new meaning and novel conceptualization) and depends crucially on
cognitive mappings between mental spaces" (p. 149).\l For definition of blending, let us cite from
Fauconnier (1997, p. 149). He states as follows:
Blending is in principle a simple operation. but in pr.lctice gives rise to myri.2d possibilities. It operates on twO
Input menal spaces to yield a third space, the blmd. The blend inherilS partial structure from the input spaces and
has emergent structure of its own.
Under this informal definition, Fauconnier points out that "grammatical constructions [interpreted
as pairings of forms and meanings) are bknds. which are entrenched bur evolve diachronically. The
general driving force behind this phenomenon is the linguistic pressure to represent complex interactions
ofevents by making ma..ximum use of existing grammatical constructions" (p. 173).
Fauconnier analyzes. for example, Goldberg's caused motion construction, exemplified by (36),
as a pairing of the form "NP V NP PP" and the schematic meaning "a causes b to move to c by
doing d" as specified in (37).
(36) The sergeant waved the tanks into the compound.
(37) NP V NP PP
a d b c
In (36), in fact. wave is used so that it is associated with emergent meaning: wave is inherently an
intransitive verb which does not take object, though wave at y. wave for Y, or wave against Y may be
possible.
As a preliminary, Fauconnier suggests that the pairing of the form F = NP V NP PP and the
constructional meaning Ai = "a causes b to move c by doing d" can be construed as an interconnection
between rwo "mental spaces", namely It and 12 , as illustrated in Figure 8.2
11. See also Fauconnier (1994) for more infornution ofmenal spaces theory.
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[Fauconnier's Figure 6.13 with slight modification of mine]
To I) and 12' Fauconnier gives the following definitions (p. 173).
(38) II: Input 1: the basic construction, found in many languages, [Do do bQ GJr 2 where do is an
action (e.g., throwing, putting) that causes motion and transfer ofbo from the agent Do to
some location co' It is expressed in English through the synuctic form: NP V NP PP [as
inJohn throws the ball to Susan].
Ii- Input 2: a causal sequence of the form: [[a ACTS] CAUSES [b MOVE c)).
It is noticeable that in Figure 8.2, multiple correspondences are treated as multiple connections. For
example, do in II is connected to WAVE, CAUSE, and MOVE in I r This is a mental space theoretical
way of suting that wavt in (36) corresponds to complex predicate CAUSE-MOVE in Goldberg's caused
motion construction, on the one hand, and the means of realization, R, on the other.
After this preliminary sketch, Fauconnier goes on to revise the interconnection illustrated in








Blend of /, and /2
Figure 8.3
[Fauconnier's Figure 6.14, p. 174, with slight modification of mine]
where a new space, Blend (call this B), is created, which is a space whose elements are (selective)
blending of input spaces I I and 12,
4.2 (onceptul JlfObIems with FatKOnnifl's account in terms of conceptual b1eftding
Having seen some details of Fauconnier's blending account of construction effect, I want to make
some remarks on his account.
It is clear that Fauconnier defines blending as an operation which is first and foremost "conceptually
driven", and for this reason his blending account no more takes surface syntax seriously than
Goldberg's account does. To wimess, his 12, which specifies the schematic meaning of the construction,
12. F~ucormier origin2lly writes here an bn Cn II" which seems inconsistent.
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is associated to no synuctic information. There is a complication, however: Is conceptual blending
exclusively conceptual? Or, more specifically, Is formation of spaces like I, independent of surface
~~? .
Fauconnier talks as if "concept formation" that results in space construction of I~= ([0 d] CAUSE
[b MOVE e)]lus nothing to do with synuctic formation. This is partly because abstract semantics like
I~ have no faithful realizations at surface ~ta..". Wimess the impossibility of the follo\\;ng sentence.
(39) *The sergeant wave(d) caused the tanks move(d) into the compound.
Despite this fact, however, it is uken for granted that abstract semantics like I~ "approximate"
meanings ofsentences like (36). But why?
The bct that I: has no faithful surface form is even utilized to argue for "pure" mental spaces like
1::0 which, unlike 11' lack ~uctic information altogether. But what is it that guarantees that I~
approximates the exact meaning of (36), for example?
The assumption that I~ approximates the meaning of (36) is itself question-begging, and, I argue,
as gratuitous as Goldberg's assumption that meaning schemas like X C....USES Y TO RECEIVE Z BY
V-L"lG Z (= M,) approximate meanings ofsentences like A/IllJo;y:ed Bill the letter.
If I~ approximates the meaning of (36), it is equally certain that other forms like the following
should do.
(40) I':: [[0 dJ) TO CAUSE [b TO MOVE c)]
I".;. [[0 dJ) so THAT [b MOVE e]]
But the SUtus of 1'~ and I": is different from Fauconnier's 12 in one crucial point. These have
respective faithful surface realizations because they are, by definition, meanings of the following
sentences.
(41) a. X Vto cause Yto move Z
b. X V so that Y move Z
This clarifies that the stipulation of abstract semantics ([a d] CAUSE [b MOVE ell to account for
blending is vacuous for the same reason that Goldberg's abstract semantics like X CAUSES Y TO
RECEIVE Z by V-ING Z (= M1) is vacuous.
To see how arbitrarily 12 is determined, it 'l.vill suffice to look at the following diagram, which
illustrates the "multiplicity" of conceptual linkage to I~.
!l
... 1,"
00 do I bo do bo00 CO TO CAlISE TO WOVE CO 00 so THAT MOVE Co
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
NP PP NP V roY NP roY PP NP V Conj NP V PP
Figure 8.4
A5 we have seen, Fauconnier's blending account crl1ciaIly relies on the link between II and 12' but, as
this di~ reveals, there are many other form/meaning pairs, e.g., 1'1' 1"2' that may play the same
role as II does. It is trivial to note that (vacuously) blending 1'1 and 1::0 for example, never yields the
blend that is in need. But this triviality should be contrasted \vith the effectiveness of blending II and
I~. Thus, if caused motion construction, for example, is indeed a blend of II and I~, then it must be
cX'Plained why II is selected, in exclusion of other form/meaning pairs, to mean 12, This raises a
serious problem, What makes [a db e] the blend of II and 12? Or, in other words, why is it that [a d
b e) is not a blend of 1'1 and 12 , for example?
But it will be of no use to try to find the kind of answer that we are eager to know in
Fauconnier's account which ignores surface ~ta.."( altogether. The reason is simple: the real moth-ation
for a specialized surface synuctic formation that we are looking for is lost as soon as the meaning of
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11 is "translated into" 12 , If syntactic motivation is not accounted for, it is hardly true that construction
effect is accounted for.
To summarize, Fauconnier's blending account may be interesting as an "application" of mental
spaces theory to syntactic phenomena, but it is by no means so much revealing in itsel£ This is partly
because it is almost trivial that such powerful mechanism as mapping, unless restricted in some
interesting way, can handle relevant phenomena. Even ignoring such triviality, Fauconnier's blending
account is no more explanatory than Goldberg's construction account, at least as it stands, because it
separates synu.x and semantics rather than integrating them. In Fauconnier's mental spaces theory, as
well as in Goldberg's construction grammar approach, constructions are considered as pairings
berween syntactic forms and semantic contents. But this idea is already a contradiction, since it
fallaciously presupposes two impossible objects: one is syntactic forms without semantic contents,
and another is semantic contents without syntactic forms. But we have already been led to realize
thar this nukes no sense. Pairings between fOtrn5 like X waved Y Z with semantics X CAUSES Y TO
MOVE Z BY WAVING AT Z are, as noted above, really relations between two surface forms, lUIllely X
waved Y Z and X causes Y to movt Z by waving at Z
4.3 Altenaatin conception ef blending
Considerations so far motivate alternative conception of blending. But the revision we need is not
difficult to work out. Let me ask simply, What prevents us from conceiving of blending as one of
surface forms and their meanings at the same time? This is exactly what I want to argue for in what
follows under the rubric ofpattern bleodiag, in terms of which we can now attempt to account
for how construction effects emerge from it.13
Our alternative tries to keep f.Uthful to surface syntaX by assuming that the emergent use ofverbs
like wave in examples like (36) is still a (unusual) way of realizing the relation R between S\ and ~.
(42) S\: The sergeant waved
R:
Sz: X W the tanks into the compound.
where X is the subject and W is the verb of S2' Since X, W, and R are underspecified. a variety of
expressions can realize them. Putting aside for the moment the realization of W. it is easy to see that
such noun phrases as the sergeant, he (coreferential with "the sergeant"), and. importandy, it, that
(taking S\ as a whole (or even its action component) as antecedent) may realize X. For R, we ",ill
have:
(43) I. R =alld (as a result) he got. and (aa:ordillgly) he lead,
n. R = (in order) to get, (in order) to lead, ...
Ill. R = so tlult, ...
But we may take steps further and conceive of pattern blending as a special means for rC2lizing R. as
a higher order symbolization in the sense of Langacker (1991a, b), which bas, among other, the
following properties.
Pattern blending is a special case of composition, in which two (or more) "overlapping" syntactic
patterns are combined into one. More specifically, we conceive, for e>.-pository purposes, of F = (36)
is a blended pattern, rather than a blended space. of patterns (44)D and E, the latter of which is
schematization of more specific patterns like E' and E".
(36) F: The sergeant waved the tanks into the compound.
(44) D: The sergeant waved
E: The sergeant W the tanks into the compound
E': The sergeant got the tanks into the compound
E": The sergeant led the tanks into the compound
13. In some respects, my conception of panem blending is also inspired by D. Bolinger's syntactic blends (1961.
1967. 1977), thou~ did not propose a mechanism explicit enough to any out blen~ofpatterns. or synactic forms.
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where we assume that Win (44)E is an abstract unit that need not (and probably cannot) be oven.












: W= get, put, give, send, make, .•.
. -.







G V'= move, receive, have. bt(come), ••.
Figure 8.6
But even this diagram is less revealing, since it is still possible to reduce irrelevant informations.
~ .
Our syntactically based alternative to Fauconnier"s (gratuitously) conceptualist version ofblending
can be illustrated by the following diagram, as opposed to Fauconnier's Figure 8.3.
D X V (YJ R: Dand(as aresult) E
I I
d
a CAUSE b TO 9 f c
G 9=MOVE, RECEIVE, HAVE, BEICOME)
Figure 8.5
where D, E, F, and G are fonn-meaning pairs (and spaces of cenain son). This network claims that
F is a "blend" ofD and E, given D = X V (Y,l, E = X V Y (P) Z.
But specification in this diagram is insignificandy (and probably dubiously) redundant, since
syntactic forms and their semantic contents are separ:lted. Alternatively, we can make such fonn-meaning
correspondences "implicit" by diagramming instead as follows.
R: Dand (as aresult) E
4.4 Anote on the connection to "multiplanar" theories of representation
In this regard, it is helpful to relate the structure diagrammed in Figure 8.6 to \vhat is called
"multiplanar" representation in the literature of "autosegmental" morphology/phonology. Note that
the relation ofF [0 D and E in Figure 8.6 can be boiled down to a triadic relation, as diagrammed in
Figure 8.7.
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where solid lines indicate matching associations, and dashed lines mismatching associations. As
illustrated, solid lines connect V, P, and Z of F to D, on the one hand, and to E, on the other.
In diagrams like the one in Figure 8.7, the affinity between the two representational systems is
obvious. If we follow the terminology in the literature of autosegmental phonology/moxphology, D
and E are "autosegments" located on different "tiers" or "planes". Despite this affinity, the exact
starus ofF is unclear. It is analogous, in some interesting respects, to what is called "skeleton", but it
also has properties as a result of "plane conflation". I do not think that the affinity in question is
superficial, but the last point may suggest an incompatibility between them.
4.5 CoRStrlKtiea effe<t eaaerges wMn syntactic!semaatic override takes place
Operation ofpattern blending, diagrammed in Figure 8.7, is made simpler and easier to handle, both
conceptually and technically, than Fauconnier's version of blending. But this is not the more
interesting. Note that what is diagrammed in Figure 8.7 is exactly what the vertical composition of
subpattems, D and E into F, as illustrated in (45).
(45) D: X V (Y)
E: X W Y P Z
U U U U U U
F: X V Y P Z
where "U" symoolizes the operator of "unification".
(45) describes schematically how two patterns D = X V 0? and E = X W Y P Z are blended
into pattern F = X V Y P Z. We assume here lhat blending is a pairwise unification of all partial
(mis)matches between D and E.
As is evident in this table, what makes blending different from simple composition is that
"overrides" (e.g.• of V over W) are permitted. More specifically, blending (45)D and E involves
resolution of the following pairs of (mis)matches: <X, X>, < V, W>. «Y), Y>, < ", P>, and < ",
Z>. What is problematic is of course, < V, W>. because other (mis)matches can be unified in usual
way. It follows that blending is possible only if overriding V over W is successful. This necessitates
that 09'( V) is intensionally extended to include d(l-V).
It is important to note that we should have another blending scheme, as illustrated in (46), in
addition to (45), because (45) is responsible for Caused Motion and Resultative Constructions, \"hile


















I want to note here that it is probably an overgeneralization to conflate (46) into (45), or altematively
confute (45) into (46), the latter of which is whal Goldberg does. She does so by cunningly relaxing
the specification for Z: it may be either PP (in Caused Motion and Resultative) or PP (m Dittansitive).
But 1 find her generalization spurious, because the more exact form of(46) is the following, where p
is a "missing" preposition which contrasts with with in Joe provided Bill (with) the inJonnation, and Z is
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Putting aside the overtness ofpinE (and F), there is an overlooked difference between (45) and
(47). It is the position of the unit in D, which is shared with E (and is to be apparently "right-node
raised"). While Y, ifpresent, is the shared unit in (45). Z is the shared unit in (47).
Is Z obligatorily present in (47)D? No, nor at all. Consider the follo\'o'ing possibility of blending,


















This pattern is responsible for the following expressions, I guess.
(49) a. Joe calls his bicycle Rolling Thunder II.
b. We name the ship Queen Elizabeth.
c. jim regards his way of thinking (to be) out of fashion.
This is a point that Goldberg's account misses, if not dismisses.
4.6 Reinterpreting Goldberg's account in terms of pattern blending
Putting aside those problems of how patterns are "represented" (in mind and grammar), let us now
concentrate on the exploration into construction effect. Given (45) and (46) as general schemes for
pattern blending, we can claim that Goldberg's argument structure construction is reinterpreted in a
straightforward way. Goldberg's Caused Motion Construction and Resultative Construction are,
respectively cases where Win (45)E is likened to verbs like pllt, get, one the one hand, and to verbs
like make or get, on the other. Likewise, her Diaansitive Construction corresponds [0 the case where
Win (46)E is likened to a class of verbs which are direct and indirect syntactic/semantic variants of
give.. To see this, let us consider again groups (50)-(52). As we have seen above, sentences in
(50)-(52) are respective instantiations of dicransitive, caused motion, and resultative constructions in
the sense of Goldberg (1995).
(50) a. joe kicked Bill the ball.
b. Pat faxed Bill the letter.
(51) a. Pat sneezed the napkin off the table.
b. The sergeant waved the tank into the compound.
c. Joe kicked the ball to Bill.
d. Pat faxed the letter to Bill.
(52) a. Bill t=nmered the metal flat.
b. Bill ate himself sick.
It is almost trivial to see that all sentences in (50)-(52) are blended patterns in the sense defined
above.
4.6.6 Blending analysis of Ditransitive Construction
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Let us examine first the case of dirransitive construction, of which (50)a is an instance. This is a blend
such as characterized in (53).
(53) D: Joe kicked the ball
E: Joe W Bill 0 the ball
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
F: Joe kicked Bill 0 the ball
where patterns D and E are blended into F (by unification ,vith permission of overriding ki,ked over
U-).
But the status of E is somewhat unclear, especially regarding W. My best guess is that W may
not be occupied by any overr verb. Ifso, it will be inadequate to write, for E,Joe send Bill the ball, or
Joe ga£'e Bill the bal~ which I reserve myself from doing so. This is because, in my opinion, E is best
understood as a schematized context of vV, which emerges as mental operation of abstraction
applies to syntactic contexts for special verbs such as give, get, make, and their syntactic/semantic
derivatives such as send « give). To put it somewhat differently, construction effect is such thar
particular contexts oflexical units, such as .'inn _ Bill the lttter (or possibly _ Bill lhe letld), Ann _
the letler to Bill (or also possibly _ the letter to BiI~ "induce" the special verbs to fill it.
It should be remarked that the our view of construction effect is virtually the same as identification
of "prototypical" or "typical" contexts relative to certain verbs. I am aware that the notion that I
advocate here is different from usual prototypes. In most discussions ofprototype theory, prototypicality
is deemed as a property of items. But I advocate the notion of prototypicality of "configurations".
This is undoubtedly a controversial view, but this view, in a sense, embodies a highly "interactionist"
and "emergentist" view of meaning in that it assumes a highly "associative" theory of memory,
which is motivated by "connectionist" theorizing. I ' Since this is an issue hard to discuss concisely, I
will return to it in Concluding Remarks.
Putting aside technical issues, let us compare immediately our analysis given in (53) ,"ith
Goldberg's composition illustrated in Figure 8.1, repeated here for convenience.
Composite Structure' Ditransitive + kick
Sem: CAUSE-RECEIVE <
ar
r~c lat >IR .,,R: means KICK < kicker kicked>
~ ~ ~ ~
Syn: V SUBJ OBJ OBJ2
Figure 8.1 [c£ Goldberg's Figure 2.9, 1995, p. 54]
Ignoring irrelevant details, we may say: (i) the specification CAUSE-RECEIVE<agt, rec, pat> in the
first row, Sem, corresponds to that of (53)E; (ii) KIcK<kicker, -, kicked> in the second row, R:
means, corresponds to that of (53)D; and (iii) the result of semantic composition in the third row,
Syn, corresponds to that of(S3)F. Despite this obvious compatibility, there is still a crucial conceptual
difference. Goldberg's construction account is primarily responsible for the semantics of sentences,
where surface syntax is of secondary importance (to witness, V is the lefunost in all component
structures), whereas our account is responsible for both syntactic and semantics. This makes a great
difference.
The last point suggests that pattern blending analysis is superior to Goldberg's not only because it
is capable of taking care of the semantics as successfully as Goldberg's construction grammar account.
but also because it is capable of taking care of the synra.x as well. On these grounds, we may claim, I
believe, that pattern blending account is more elegant and even more natural than Goldberg's,
though the notion "natural" may depend crucially on one's previously formed system of assumptions.
It is unfortunately possible that my account looks like less natural than Goldberg's since it smells
14. Bates and Elman (1993) is a best introduction to connectionism: it is concise, precise, and witty, but "ery
infomutive. For more technical aspects, see Rumelhan, (t al. (1986), McClellind, et al. (1986). For fuller, but less
technical. details, see Bechtel and Abralumsen (1990), Elman, rt al. (1996).
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"transfomutionalist" to some of cognitive linguists who tend to think that devices necessary for
meaning construction are given as they are. and who do never ask for the reason of their existence. I
have nothing more to say to them.
4.6.6 Blending analysis of Caused Motion Construction
Now, let us tum to the case of caused motion cormruction. We can provide analyses as follows.
(54) D: Joe kicked the ball
£: Joe vt; the ball to Bill
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
F: Joe kicked the ball to Bill
(55) D. Pat sneezed
£: Pat ~V;I the napkin off the table
II II ~ ~ ~ ~
F: Pat sneezed the napkin off the table
As illustrated, there are two major subclasses of this construction, depending on whether V in D is
transitive or intransitive verb (or equivalendy Y is present or not). But this is not all of their
differences; their syntactic/semantic models are different, too. WI is most likely to be tailored to send
(and indirecdy to give), whereas W Il is likened to put, get, never send. Of course, it is hardly possible
to determine which verb of this class is the exact model ofE. In my view, we may give up the idea
altogether that W must be determined, especially relying on the notion of"undespecification". W is
merely a union of all ofsuch verbs.
4.6.6 A note on the relation of Caused Motion Construction
Goldberg's caused motion construction is an undergeneralization of the relevant faces. Note that the
follo\\ing patterns, which meet formal criterion F = X V Y (P) Z, as well as caused motion
construction, exhibit the opposite sort of construction effect, at least originally.
(56) a. She waked her husband with her kick.
b. He revived the sleeping beauty with his kiss.
Admittedly, the semantic contribution of with Z in these examples is more subde than other cases,
but it is still likely that even these patterns are blends ofD =X wake Y and D' = X revied Y \'lith
(57)£ and £', respectively.
(57) £: X prwide Y with Z
E': X supply Y with Z
Interestingly, also in this class, abstract motion (of Y) is "caused" by an act ofX, but not in the way
that Caused Motion Construction specifies. Despite the formal similarity to Caused Motion Con-
struction, patterns of this class behave more like Ditransitive, since causation is conceived of as a sort
of "gift", or "supply" of cause/energy. Bur this fact is puzzling as far as English lacks Xgive Y with Z,
at least overtly. I suspect that this argues for the existence of missing pin (47), which rnay realize as
with in other contex'tS like (57)£ and £ '.
Another possibility is that patterns like (57)£ and £' are semantically tailored to more basic
pattern X given Y Z, which accidentally misses preposition before Z.
4.6.6 Blending analysis ofResnltative Constrnction
Let us tum to resultative construction. The construction can be analyzed in the following way. Like
in caused motion construction, V is either transitive or intransitive.
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(58) D: Bill hammered the metal
E: Bill W the metal flat
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
F: Bill hammered the metal flat
(59) D: Bill ate
E: Bill W himself sick
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
F: Bill ate himself sick
I guess that W is similar to get. or made. since E is probably the (parsimoniously determined) union
of their syntactic contexts.
4.7 ConstnKtionaI meanings are meanings ofsyntactic contexts
Discussions so far are subsuntial enough to prepare for a reinterpretation of Goldberg's work on
derived argument structures. Let me summarize as briefly as possible.
I am willing to hold that Goldberg's account is more appealing than accounts based on lexical
semantics of verbs. But I want to claim that it is still less appealing than pattern blending account that
I have provided in his paper. Let me specify a few reasons.
The notion of constructions. defined as "fonn/meaning pairs", is in need for solving the
problem of "emergent" senses. As Goldberg correctly points out. if the meaning of Patfaxed Bill the
letter [= (50)b]. for example. is detennined exclusively by meanings oflexical items that compose it,
then it follows that there is at least one lexical item that is responsible for the emergent sense of
"benefaction" observable in the sentence. It is usual that. based on the logic of exclusion, the sense
in question is usually attributed to the "lexical meaning" of main verbs. e.g.,Jax in (50)b, which,
Goldberg claims. is implausible.
There are gaps to be filled in this argument. Indeed, whether this account is or is not implausible
crucially depends on the assumed mechanism of meaning construction. Even if there is emergent
meaning (e.g., of benefaction) in sentences like (50)b. this by no means implies that there must exist
one and only one lexical item that is exclusively responsible for the emergent sense in question. The
emergent sense need not to be attributed to none of lexical items. especially verbs. This is what
Goldberg argues for in tenns of constructions, which exist in the grammar ofEnglish, independently
of lexical meanings. But Goldberg's account seems to me an understatement, and there is another
direction to pursue. It is possible not to attribute the emergence of constructional meanings to
constructions po se. but to the interaction of the component meanings ofJexical items (except verb).
This is what I suggested above: if the interaction oflexical items is so effective that certain "missing"
verb are recalled. by context induction, to fit into synuetic contexts like Ann _ Bill the letta, it is
harder to simply assert that there are such and such constructions. This is to say that the emergent
senses may be an emergent property of a specific kind of formation, not of any fonns. Some of the
formations seem to be so much "conventionalized" to be used very productively!S
To my best knowledge, construction effects, if anything, are the other side of lexical meaning.
Constructional and lexical meanings are probably the yin and yang of verb senses. If verb senses are
positives, constructional meanings are negatives of them. Or more explicitly. constructions are
abstracted contexts into which some special. frequently used, basic-level verbs such as give. get.
make are used. They are implicit, "ghost" verbs in such abstract units. Dirransitive construction. for
example, can be reinterpreted context schema made available for other verbs. which we may
denote by X _ Y ZI_ V _. This schemas is abstracted out of an large number of instances of X give
Y Z In this sense. they are also emergent forms out of the complex interaction between surface
fonns (with implicit meanings).
4.8 Where does polysemy come from? (or. Why so many constructions?)
15. This intends d,.t the problem of productiviry is a nutter different from emerKCnce.
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Pattern blending analysis not only provides a sophisticated analysis of construction effect, but also
provides a natural solution to the problem of "polysemy", at whose solution Goldberg's account is
usually deemed to be most successful. Let us discuss this issue in some detail.
Goldberg SUtes (p. 75) that F = X V Y Z (where Z is NP) instantiates dittansitive construction if
F, as a whole, is associated to the class of inrerpreutions specified below (see also Figure 2.2 p. 38),
where I removed small capitalization.
(60) 1."X causes Y to receive Z" (central sense; e.g.,Joe gave Sally the ba/~
2. Conditions of satis£lction imply "X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z' (e.g., Joe pomued Bob a car)
3. "X enables Y to receive Z" (e.g.,Joe ptnnitkd Chris all apple)
4. "X causes Y not to receive Z" (e.g.,Joe rifu.sd Bob a cookie)
5. "X intends to cause Y to receive Z' (e.g.• Joe baked Bob a cake)
6. "X acts to cause Y to receive Z at some future point in time" (e.g., Joe bequeathed Bob a
fortl/ne)
Funhermore, Goldberg sutes (p. 76) that F = X V Y Z (where Z is directional PP) insuntiates
caused motion construction if F, as a whole, is associated to the class of interpretations specified
below (see also pp. 161-162).
(61) 1."X causes Y to move Z" (e.g., Pat pushed the piano itzto the room)
2. Conditions of satis£lction imply "X causes Y to move Z" (e.g., Pat ordered him into the
room)
3. "X enables Y to move Z" (e.g., Pat allowed Cllris illto the room)
4. "X causes Y not to move from 2" (e.g.. Pat locked Chris into the room)
5. "X helps Y to move Z" (e.g., Pat assuted Chris itzto the room)
The problem of polysemy is real, and really complex, but I suspect it is not so complex as Goldberg
argues. In my view, her account uselessly complicates the problem which is less complex, if my
contention is true that pattern blending serves as a simpler and superior mechanism, not necessarily
generative, to account for such proliferation of senses. To subsuntiate this c!aim, let us look more
closely at the problem by analyzing some examples.
Take for example F = Joe promised Bob a car, an insunce of Goldberg's (60)2. If our blending
analysis is correct, F is a blend of D and E, such as specified below.
(62) D: Joe promised a car
E: Joe W Bob a car
F: Joe promised Bob a car
We may reasonably assume that F inherits the semantics of D, as well as th2t ofE.
Win E can be approxinuted by an appropriate verb (e.g., give), assuming a mechanism for the
semantic approximation of W, which I presume is essentially pragmatic and associative. Note,
however, that the assumed mechanism of W-approxinution cannot be economically accounted for
by the notion of construction. In construction gtaIIlJlUt accounts like Goldberg's, a decision must be
arbittarily nude as to how nuny constructions are posited., since there is no limit on it.
In pattern blending account, however, give is merely a ~"pical, or rather a "fui\-safe" approximation
of W. Indeed, W nuy be more specific, depending on assumptions usually formed conversationally.
Consider the following case.
(63) In his last will, Joe promised Bob his Rolli Royce (but, he was mistaken; it was sold to
someone long before).
If W exists in this example, it should be bequeath rather than give. Of course, this does not mean that
Wmay not be give: the alleged inappropriateness ofgive for W here is probably due to the £let that it
is an "undersutement", since more information is inferable even from this short context. Bur such
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complication happens merely because the act ofbequeathing is a special case ofpromising.
There is nothing complicated in the semantics ofF, as fu as F is regarded as a blend, or a special
case of composition of D and E. Specifically, the special sense that Goldberg attributed to (60)2 is a
simple consequence of a simple fact:: the semantics ofF is composition of those ofD and E. So. it is
redundanr to specify, like Goldberg does. that there is a specialized construction which assigns to F
= X V Y Z meaning M such as in (60)2, because, if pattern blending is assumed, additional sense
'Conditions of satisfaction imply .. : is inherited from D which consists of a verb, promise. whose
semantics is responsible for the added sense, if it is not inherited from E. I suspect that Goldberg is
mistakenly trying to account for conditions by their effects.
Admittedly, whether such senses are conditions or effects ofpattern blending is itself debatable.
To be fair, I admit that it is needed to specify certain independently motivated conditions for panern
blending. I am willing to admit that the way to specify them is implicidy incorporated in Goldberg's
wOtk. Crucial mechanism must be "chained" relaxation of selectional restrictions for U" to yield
"radial" structure in the sense ofLakoff(1987). Abstracdy, the story goes like this. Given blending of
D = X promise Z and E = X W Y Z (where W is semantically approximated by giv~) is sanctioned.
This internally prepares a chain of relaxations one of which is blending ofD ' = X bequeath Z and E.
The basic mechanism of this is a variery sorts of "inheritance" in the sense of Goldberg, one of
which is such a relation that D' is a special case of D. Grammar in action is full of such preparations.
Metaphorically, these preparations are guns loaded \\ith bullets. Those guns may not or need not
fire, since discharge of such potential is highly contingent: there are a number of "blocking" faCtors
to prevent actually firings. Admittedly, preparation of potentials is not a sufficient condition, or e~'en
not a necessary condition, but this does not really matters, I believe, because it works as a rough
characterization of the basic mechanism. More than this is a tall story.
We are talking now about the "ell:tension" of existing constructions, and self-changing of
grammar. This process could be best understood in terms of "self-organization" of grammar. which I
contend is a "chaotic" process that highly complex interactions of"internal" and "ell:rernal" conditions
bring about. With the distinction of the two kinds of conditions, what I have sketched above,
together with Goldberg at least in spirit, is at best sketch out a hypothesis about the relevant internal
conditions. Plainly, external conditions are out of scope, since I am rather skeptical that they can be
usefully specified and exploited in linguistic explanation, at least without quantitative basis. For this
specific reason, I am satisfied that conditions for pattern blending cannot be explained away.
But. if the internal conditions are the same as what Goldberg specifies in (60), and (61), under
polysemous senses ofF, circularity is sure to begin. In (60) and (61), conditions are stated in terms of
effects. By doing this, Goldberg is caught in the same kind of trap that generative grammarians are
in, who claim, quite fallaciously, that granunatical rules "account for" grammatical phenomena that
are "described by" them. This manifests "first order isomorphism fallacy" in the sense of Kugler. et
al. (1982).
To add evidence, let us take for example Par loclml Chris into the room. Blending analysis of this
expression is either (64) or (65) below, depending on whether lock semantically selects as primary
object Chris (affected object) or the room (location).
(64) D. Pat locked Chris
E: Pat W Chris into the room
H II II II II II
F: Pat locked Chris into the room
(65) D: Pat locked the room
E: Pat W Chris into the room
II II II II II II
F: Pat locked Chris into the room
My best guess is that W is approximated by PI/I, especially when motional preposition into is present.
Pragmatics should playa crucial role here again. Note that the induced sense ofput is not simple; it is
better approximated by pul back, since it is "reagentive" against Chris's effort to go out the room.
Again, the elaborated sense "X causes Y not to move from Z" partly comes from the semantics
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of lock. From the sutement "Pat locked Bob", for example, one can easily infer that "Pat made Bob
suy somewhere". The implied place can be denoted by itl the room. This reveals that what gives
constructional effect to this example is the use of into the room instead of ill the room. Consider the
following case, where illto is replaced by sutive prepositions ill or inside. We may reasonably assume
that (66)a is the blend ofb and c (or c'), whether cor c' is irrelevant here.
(66) a. Pat locked Chris ill(side) the room.
b. Pat W Chris in(side) the room.
c. Pat locked Chris.
c'. Patlocked the room.
m this case, W could be best approximated by ketp: J-V = put is an undersutement in this case, since
"put Y in(side) Z" does not entail "keep Y in(side) Z". On this ground, I claim that there is nothing
mysterious in F = Pat locked Chris into the room if it is recognized that F is a pragmatically augmented
version of F' = Pat lo,ked Chris in(side) the room in that the sense of potential verb keep in F'
undergoes accommodation based on such inference that ",X's putting Y back into Z" (where Z =
the room) is a special case of",X's keeping Y in(side) Z' as far as there is "Ys attempt to go out Z".
We may be sure that humans can reason quite "heuristically" like this.
Discussions so tar suggest that pattern blending provides a better account of the "nerwork" of
polysemy, of ditransitive construction in (60), and of caused motion construction in (61). which
Goldberg takes great pains to enumerate one by one. On our view, polysemous senses in question
are fairly straightforward "side-effeets" of pattern blending. To put more adequately, this is because
the semantics ofF, a blend ofD and E. is semantic composition ofwhat are meant by D = X V (Xl
(or X V Z) and E = X W Y (P) Z on their 0\1I1n grounds. In my view, Goldberg is right in
emphasizing the role of E, from which constructional meanings are partly derived, but she is
nevertheless v,Tong in overestimating the role ofE, and underestimating the role of D.
What is at issue is the problem of compositionality, especially the nature of it, I suspect.
Goldberg indeed takes great pains to convince us that constructional meanings assigned to F = X V
Y Z are not, and even cannot be, specified compositionally. But her effort seems to me poindess
and unrewarding, partly because whether meaning construction is compositional or not is itself a
matter of definition, and partly because this effort itself deprives her account of explanatory power. It
is clear that she mistakes effects for conditions of them. By this misconception, she is forced to
preposterously claim that what are "described by" constructions are "accounted for" by them.
5 Conduding Remarks
I showed in this paper that Goldberg's construction grammar account ofargument structure phenomena
can be enriched under reinterpreution that I proposed. But I know my own work owes gready to
her work, so I am somewhat afraid that I might have misreprsented her account and approach. I
want to add a few remarks that will remedy them, if any.
5.1 What are "iKcounted for" in Goldberg's account?
It may be argued that the view that I advocate here is, in the end, equivalent to construction
accounts like Goldberg's. This is not really the case, I believe. In construction accounts, the
existence of constructions is the reason for the emergent meanings of sentences; in other words, it
predicts, fallaciously I think, that the sense of, say, benefaction can emerge as tar as ditransitive
construction exists. But it is clear that this account obscures the very reason why such constructions
can ever exist in a grammar. At worst, constructions are merely stipulated fot explanation of relevant
facts, and justified by (usually partial) success of intended explanation. In this regard, the SUtus of
constructions is not so different from that of generative rules (e.g., linking rules, lexical redundancy
rules), which constructions are intended to replace. At worst, this is merely a translation of one
mystery into another, though the degree of implausibility decreases a litde. In imeractionist view,
constructions are no more reasons than generative rules are: they are merely effects of ill known
causes that lead, in combination, to a variety of emergent properties one of which is the existence of
so-called constructional meanings, not necessarily of constructions per Sf.
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It is likely that the essence of Goldberg's claim is that even abstract fonus such as F == S VOl (P)
02 are "gestalts" in that they have meanings of their own, which cannot be reduced to the meanings
of their parts. This fonus a basic claim of cognitive linguistics against for:malist linguistics which holds
strict compositionality. If strict compositionality is assumed, then it makes no sense to claim that F
has meaning irreducible to the meanings of its parts.
Goldberg starts her argument by noting that sentences of the form have specifiable range of
meanings which are not predictable from the lexical meanings of their components, but become
predictable if fonus themselves have meanings of their own. But her argument is false, at least
literally. Construction meanings, if they are real, are still meanings that are determined by their
component meanings, though interactively, because, if my analysis is correct, the inherendy under-
specified meaning of W becomes identifiable, or at least so significantly narrowed to be identifiable,
only with the semantic construction ofX, Y, and (P) Z
Goldberg's is still right, I want to hold, in arguing that argument structure is an "emergent"
ptoperty, and I am willing to agree with her on this point. So, what really marrers is not whether
constructional meaning is or is not reducible to le.x.ical meanings, or even whether it is reducible to
the meaning of main verbs; but what really matters is the way that meaning construction is
"compositional", or the way the meanings ofparts contribute to the meaning of the whole.
S.2 Toward anew conception of"compositionality"
The cognitivist ban on the compositionality in favor of gestalt-like property is a bad idea, I suspect.
Compositionality is preserved, or rather it is "overly" preserved. Note that construction effect is
berrer characterized by the "excess" of meaning composition rather than the "lack" of it; for, in my
view, constructional meaning ofF == X V Y P Z emerges when "background" patterns like D == X
V Yand E == X _ Y P Z, among others, are interpreted. Why is there such apparently "superfluous",
if not unnecessary, construction of meaning? In my view, what is really at issue is the notion of
"proper analysis", accordingly to which analysis ofpatterns may not be overlapping and tangling.
But there is another point of view that seems fully compatible ,vith the puzzling fact: it is to
view grammar as a "performance system", where robusmess and conciseness need be well balanced.
It is easy to note that, generally, simpler systems are faster but more fragile. Redundancy is a virtue
to lead to robusmess of a system. If robusmess is taken into account, it is less mysterious if meaning
construction relies on crucial use of overlapping.
Perhaps, we have been misguided for a long time by a "bad" picture of meaning construction,
which I claim fails to draw essential properties of meaning construction. In this picture, structure ofa
sentence is a "tree" with many branches (though this tree grows downward), whose leaves are
(possibly null) lexical items. Meaning of this sentence is so constructed that meanings of the lexical
items are "composed" as they "climb up" the tree.
If this popular picture depicts the reality correcdy, there should be no chance for background
patterns like X _ Y P Z to be associated to some meaning. But it is sure that this is a bad picture
that distorrs much of reality, and we may reject it all together with those "connectionists", or
cognitive scientists working in the framework of "parallel distributed processing" (PDP). It is
remarked that in connectionist conception, it is more likely that proper analysis is not guaranteed.
Processes in connectionist networks are massively parallel to be capable of successfully handle such
notorious problems of overlapping and discontinuous constituents. To illustrate, I present below a
diagram which illustrates required handling of discontinuity and overlapping in meaning construction
of F == joe faxed Bill the memo, where lexical units. namely X == joe, V == fax, Y == Bill, P == 0, and Z
== the memo, are arranged at the bottom, and the result of composition, F, is at the top. Between
them are "incomplete" composite units like A == Joe kieked 0, B == S faxed the memo, and C == S W
Bill 0 the memo (where S is for subject, 0 for object, and W for implicit verb) are arranged.
--,
.















This diagram no longer illustrates a constituent structure. Not only discontinuous constituents are
pennitted (e.g., B = Joe faxed the memo), but multiplicity of constituents is permitted so that some
units, Joe and the memo, are composed twice. My reason for preferring diagrams like this is deeper,
however. I hold that this unusual sort of diagrams indeed characterize more adequately the overall
computation responsible for pattern blending of F, though I unfortunately can offer, in this paper,
no detailed arguments or pieces of evidence. But I have good evidence, as well as reason, to believe
that so-called "phrase structures" or "constituent structure" are poor devices to represent syntactic
structure of sentences. I \vill discuss this point in enough detail in my Ph.D. dissertation (Kuroda in
preparation). In this work, I will argue more thoroughly that syntactic structures, ifany, are not trees
but "webs" of connections among words through which words communicate with each other.
Under this provisional note, 1 claim that pattern matching analysis is coming to provide your with a
new view of meaning construction based on a new concepcion of syntactic structures.
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